A Literature Review: CHINA’S INTERNET CENSORSHIP

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Introduction

The Great Firewall (GFW) of China, a symbol of one of the most extensive and sophisticated censorship systems in the world, traces its ideological foundation to a favorite saying of Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s: “If you open the window, both fresh air and flies will be blown in.” This philosophy encapsulates the balance China sought during its transition to a socialist market economy, which began as part of Deng’s economic reforms. These reforms marked a significant shift away from the rigid political ideologies of the Cultural Revolution, leading China toward economic liberalization and opening its markets to foreign investment. However, alongside economic freedom, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) emphasized the need to safeguard its values and political stability, necessitating mechanisms to “swat flies” of unwelcome ideologies while benefiting from global connectivity.

The internet's arrival in China in 1994 brought new opportunities for development but also heightened the need for ideological control. To manage the growing influence of foreign ideas and ensure political stability, the Chinese government began developing systems to block access to selected foreign websites and regulate cross-border internet traffic. These early measures, such as basic IP blocking, soon evolved into a comprehensive legal framework and more sophisticated censorship strategies, culminating in the modern Great Firewall. The transition from rudimentary controls to advanced systems reflects not only technological innovation but also the CCP’s increasing focus on internet sovereignty, particularly under the leadership of Xi Jinping.

Since Xi became General Secretary, censorship efforts have intensified significantly, aligning with his vision of controlling the internet within the framework of sovereign governance. Key measures include the blocking of platforms like Google and Facebook, the regulation of cross-border traffic, and most recently, the introduction of policies such as the compulsory display of users’ IP locations on social media platforms like Weibo. These actions underscore the CCP’s commitment to ensuring that the digital sphere aligns with its political priorities, even as China participates in the globalized digital economy.

This essay explores the evolution of the Great Firewall, tracing its development across three distinct stages of technological and legal advancement. It examines how the Chinese government has harnessed state influence to shape online discourse through overt and covert strategies, as well as the societal challenges and resilience that have emerged in response to these controls.

By reviewing the works of Hoang et al., Lee and Liu, and Roberts, the development of China's Great Firewall (GFW) can be delineated into three distinct stages, characterized by advancements in technical capabilities, the establishment of legal frameworks, and the adoption of increasingly sophisticated censorship strategies.

The Growth of GFW: From Simple Blocks to Sophisicated Control

Early Stage: Basic Blocking Mechanisms

In its initial phase, the GFW relied on relatively rudimentary tools to implement censorship. Hoang et al. note that the system primarily used a small pool of forged IP addresses to block access to targeted websites, reflecting its limited infrastructure. At this stage, censorship mechanisms were basic, focusing on direct methods such as IP blocking, DNS poisoning, and keyword filtering, which selectively prevented users from accessing politically sensitive content. Similarly, Roberts identifies this period as one dominated by foundational blocking tools that disrupted access to information in a straightforward manner. These measures laid the groundwork for China’s digital control, albeit in a relatively unsophisticated form.

Middle Stage: Expansion and Legal Consolidation

As internet usage expanded globally and domestically, the GFW evolved to meet increasing demands. Hoang et al. highlight the infrastructure's significant growth, with the system now overseeing over 1,781 IPv4 and 1,799 IPv6 addresses. This transition to IPv6—a more scalable system with vast address capacity—demonstrates China’s ability to adapt its censorship mechanisms to the growing complexity of the global internet. Alongside technological advances, China’s legal framework for censorship became more comprehensive during this phase.

Lee and Liu emphasize the role of ambiguous legal provisions that legitimize and enforce censorship. For example, the Regulations on Computer Information Network and Internet Security, Protection, and Management (1997) mandated Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to block and report content deemed illegal; Article 5 of the Provisions on the Administration of Internet Information Service (2000) explicitly prohibited content perceived to "endanger national security" or "disrupt public order." These legal ambiguities enabled both preemptive and punitive censorship under the guise of national security, allowing the state to contain dissent within boundaries defined by its authority.

Modern Stage: Strategic Shifts in Censorship Mechanisms

Roberts argues that China’s censorship strategies have transitioned to more nuanced approaches, characterized by friction—creating barriers to accessing information—and fear, which relies on selective punishment to instill widespread self-censorship. Friction is exemplified by the GFW, which blocks access to platforms like Google Search, YouTube, and X (formerly Twitter), making it increasingly difficult for users to obtain uncensored information. Fear is illustrated by the case of Ren Zhiqiang, a high-profile businessman sentenced to 18 years in prison for corruption, bribery, and misuse of public funds. While these charges were the official justification, Ren’s punishment was widely viewed as a response to his outspoken criticism of the government, particularly Xi Jinping's handling of the COVID-19 pandemic.

In this modern stage, China’s censorship mechanisms have also adopted more sophisticated strategies that go beyond blocking content to actively manipulate public behavior and narratives. Roberts identifies flooding as a key tactic, where the Chinese government overwhelms the information space with distractions, propaganda, and entertainment. This less visible yet highly effective strategy redirects public attention away from politically sensitive issues, ensuring that state legitimacy and social stability are maintained.

State Influence on Social Media

China’s use of social media as a tool for governance and control demonstrates the intricate interplay between state influence and digital platforms. This section examines how the Chinese government shapes online discourse through both overt and covert methods, such as official accounts, collaborations with influencers, the Fifty-Cent Army, and algorithmic censorship. Additionally, it explores the concept of dual accountability, where social media serves as a feedback loop between citizens and the state, enabling whistleblowing while reinforcing government control. By analyzing these mechanisms, we gain insight into the strategic role of censorship in maintaining stability and shaping public opinion in China’s digital landscape.

Overt Influence

Overt state influence refers to methods through which the Chinese government openly shapes online narratives and public opinion. These methods include the use of official government accounts, collaboration with celebrities and influencers, as well as leveraging platforms like Weibo to amplify propaganda.

Government presence on social media platforms such as Weibo is significant, serving as a direct propaganda channel to reach the public. In Why Does China Allow Freer Social Media?, the authors document government influence on Sina Weibo using a dataset of 13.2 billion blog posts published from 2009 to 2013. Their analysis reveals that the reported number of official accounts significantly underestimates the true extent of state presence, as there are approximately 600,000 government-affiliated accounts operating on the platform. These accounts are used not only to disseminate official policies and state-approved narratives but also to engage with and monitor public opinion.

The Chinese government also engages in collaboration and control of public figures, particularly celebrities and influencers, to achieve state objectives. Creemers in Cyber China highlights the dual role of influencers and Key Opinion Leaders (KOLs) in state propaganda efforts. These individuals are often regulated or co-opted to promote content aligned with government priorities. For instance, influencers may be directed to support nationalistic causes, amplify government achievements, or criticize foreign entities. Celebrities, under state pressure or encouragement, frequently share patriotic messages and participate in state-backed campaigns, reinforcing the government's desired narratives.

Covert Influence

While overt strategies openly promote state narratives, covert state influence operates under the radar to subtly manipulate public opinion and control information. These methods include the Fifty-Cent Army (wumao dang)—a term derived from claims such commentators were reportedly paid RMB 0.50 for every post—and the use of algorithmic censorship, both of which enable the Chinese government to guide online discourse without directly revealing its involvement.

The Fifty-Cent Army consists of anonymous internet commentators who are either government employees, students, or part-time hires. As highlighted by Han in Manufacturing Consent in Cyberspace, these individuals are paid nominal wages—historically fifty cents per post—to guide public opinion in favor of the Chinese government. Key characteristics of the Fifty-Cent Army include flooding online forums and discussions with pro-government content, thereby diluting dissenting opinions and creating the illusion of widespread support for the state. Strategic interventions during politically sensitive events also promote state narratives.

In a study conducted by Harvard University, it was estimated that the Fifty-Cent Party fabricated approximately 448 million social media comments annually. These posts were designed not to engage in debates but to strategically distract and divert public attention from sensitive issues. Instead of arguing with dissenters, the comments often focused on spreading positive, non-controversial messages such as celebrations of national achievements, ensuring that political criticism was overshadowed.

In addition to human-driven manipulation, the Chinese government employs algorithmic censorship to automatically detect and suppress undesirable content. Cobbe in Algorithmic Censorship by Social Platforms provides a technical summary of these systems, highlighting two key mechanisms: Hash Matching and Machine Learning Systems. These systems can detect patterns of politically sensitive speech, keywords, or even visual elements that hint at dissent.

Dual Accountability

Censorship in China operates on a nuanced principle of dual accountability, wherein local officials are held responsible not only to their superiors within the state hierarchy but also to the public, who act as de facto whistleblowers through social media platforms.

In this system of dual accountability, citizens become informal watchdogs, exposing corruption, abuse of power, or incompetence by local officials through viral posts or hashtags. This dynamic creates an unusual feedback loop in which local officials are incentivized to address public grievances swiftly to avoid punishment from their superiors, while the central government uses this public criticism to ensure that local governance aligns with state priorities, enhancing its overall control.

This carefully managed balance allows the state to tolerate certain levels of public dissent while suppressing content that poses a genuine threat to stability. As described in How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression, the Chinese government does not aim to eliminate all negative opinions online. Instead, it targets content that poses a threat to social stability by encouraging collective mobilization or organized protests.

Societal Impacts: Challenges and Resilience

Challenges: Censorship, Isolation, Polarization

China’s approach to censorship and internet governance presents significant societal challenges, particularly in the realms of media freedom, knowledge access, and public opinion. These challenges illuminate the complexities of maintaining state control while navigating the demands of a modern, interconnected society. One of the most visible challenges lies in the realm of media and information access. While censorship in China is comprehensive, as Jonathan Hassid explains, it is not absolute. Journalists and editors frequently test the boundaries of what is permissible, creating a “push-and-pull” relationship between media outlets and the state. The government enforces compliance through a dual mechanism of pre-publication self-censorship—where media professionals anticipate and avoid sensitive topics—and post-publication punishments, which silence or penalize critical reporting retroactively. This dynamic constrains journalistic freedom, as media outlets attempt to balance engaging content with the risk of state intervention. A notable example is the Wenzhou high-speed rail crash, where media initially reported aggressively on government failures, reflecting widespread public anger. However, the state soon stepped in, silencing critical voices and steering the coverage toward official narratives. This incident illustrates how censorship undermines accountability and erodes public trust in the media.

In addition to its impact on media freedom, censorship has significantly restricted access to global knowledge, particularly following the Google blockade imposed under the Great Firewall. As Zheng and Wang highlight, Google’s absence has reduced Chinese users’ ability to access diverse ideas, technical knowledge, and global research, thereby constraining opportunities for education and innovation. While domestic alternatives like Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent have risen to fill the gap, these platforms often lack the global scope and technical sophistication of Google’s tools. The reliance on domestically controlled platforms exacerbates informational isolation, further restricting opportunities for intellectual and cultural exchanges between China and the rest of the world. For instance, researchers and students face significant challenges in accessing international academic resources and collaborative opportunities, highlighting the broader implications of restricted knowledge networks.

Beyond the domains of media and knowledge access, the challenges extend to public opinion and societal perspectives. As Yida Zhai notes, public opinion in China reflects a complex interplay between state-driven narratives and societal orientations. On domestic issues, increased trust in government and higher evaluations of China’s democracy coincide with lower support for political reform, suggesting that the state’s efforts to shape public discourse reinforce satisfaction with the status quo. Interestingly, Zhai’s findings indicate that less educated individuals are more likely to support reforms, revealing an educational divide in attitudes toward political change. Meanwhile, in the realm of foreign relations, Chinese citizens express growing skepticism toward the United States, particularly in the context of U.S.-Asia relations. This perspective aligns with national narratives that emphasize China’s rising influence as the dominant power in Asia while portraying foreign powers as threats to stability. Such sentiments underscore the success of the state’s propaganda in shaping a unified national identity, even as it fosters polarization in international perceptions.

The challenges posed by China’s censorship and governance strategies are multifaceted, shaping public discourse, access to knowledge, and global engagement. While the state’s efforts to control media and public opinion have maintained domestic stability, they come at the cost of journalistic freedom, intellectual exchange, and balanced international perspectives. These challenges reflect the inherent tension between achieving state control and fostering a resilient, forward-looking society capable of thriving in a globalized world.

Resilience: Creativity, Technology, Community

To navigate the stringent censorship of China’s digital landscape, individuals employ various technological workarounds and innovative strategies to maintain access to information and spaces for expression. As Margaret E. Roberts explains, tools like Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), proxy servers, and anonymization software are pivotal in circumventing the Great Firewall. These technologies enable users to access restricted global content, reflecting the ingenuity of Chinese netizens despite the government’s increasing legal and technical restrictions on such tools. Alongside these methods, coded language and euphemisms play a crucial role in fostering resilience. By substituting sensitive terms with innocuous alternatives, citizens can discuss controversial topics without triggering automated censorship systems. For instance, the term “May 35th” is used in place of Tiananmen Square, allowing subtle yet meaningful dialogue about historical events that remain politically taboo.

A compelling testament to resilience is the creative use of memes and visual content to critique authority and navigate censorship. As An Xiao Mina notes, memes operate as a form of “coded language,” blending humor, allegory, and visual ambiguity to challenge state power without overtly violating censorship rules. The Batman meme, for instance, symbolized political corruption during the Wang Lijun and Bo Xilai scandal, portraying Wang as a conflicted antihero who embodies both justice and duplicity. Similarly, the Pandaman meme, featuring riot police in panda-themed uniforms, humorously highlighted contradictions in government propaganda by juxtaposing symbols of gentleness with state surveillance and repression. The Blind Man meme, inspired by human rights activist Chen Guangcheng, subtly amplified calls for justice by visually supporting his advocacy without explicitly naming him. More recently, Winnie-the-Pooh has been censored following its association with memes comparing the character to General Secretary Xi Jinping, which the Chinese Communist Party perceived as mocking and disrespectful. These examples underscore how cultural creativity allows netizens to critique authority, foster solidarity, and spark meaningful discussions, even within the confines of a tightly censored digital landscape.

Complementing these digital strategies are offline networks and interpersonal communication, which offer critical channels for sharing information in heavily monitored environments. Encrypted messaging apps like Telegram and private chat groups are instrumental in coordinating protests, exchanging sensitive ideas, and disseminating information outside state-controlled platforms. These methods create alternative communication infrastructures, reducing reliance on heavily surveilled digital spaces and further demonstrating the adaptability of Chinese citizens.

Limitations

This literature review, while offering a comprehensive overview of the evolution and implications of China's Great Firewall (GFW), is subject to several limitations that should be considered when interpreting its findings.

Focus on Existing Literature: The review relies on secondary sources and published studies, which may not fully capture the latest developments in China’s censorship strategies or the dynamic nature of its digital governance. As censorship mechanisms evolve rapidly, some details may become outdated or fail to reflect the current state of the GFW.

Restricted Access to Data: Due to the inherently opaque nature of China’s censorship policies and practices, obtaining direct access to government documents or firsthand accounts remains challenging. Much of the analysis depends on external observations and indirect data, which may lead to gaps in understanding the inner workings of the GFW.

Societal Diversity: The essay addresses societal impacts and resilience but may oversimplify the heterogeneity of Chinese citizens’ experiences. Regional, educational, and generational differences in access to technology and the ability to circumvent censorship are significant factors that require further exploration.

Author: Xiyue Yuan